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COOPERATIVE RAPE
Gabriel M. Glasser *
In 1991, two men forced a teenager off of a main road and into an
abandoned house, where they beat her with their fists, cut her with broken
glass, and alternated between holding a shard of glass to her throat and raping
her.1 At Defendant Taylor’s trial, the Court applied a “sexual battery by
multiple perpetrators” statute, which enhanced the defendant’s sentence from
a second-degree felony (punishable by up to fifteen years’ imprisonment) to
a first-degree felony (punishable by up to thirty years’ imprisonment).2
In contrast, consider the following hypothetical: Suppose that only one
perpetrator, Phillip, forced the teenage victim, Victoria, off of a main road
and into an abandoned house. Once inside the house, Phillip attacked
Victoria, resulting in the same injuries that Taylor inflicted on his victim: a
“contusion[,] swollen cheek[,] laceration on her neck, and multiple linear
lacerations to both forearms.”3 However, Phillip did not rape Victoria, but
rather threatened to kill her if she did not return to the main road and
prostitute herself.4 Victoria—visibly beaten and distraught—stood on the
side of the road. Jones, a passerby, then approached and propositioned
Victoria. He ignored the tears, bruises, and blood, led Victoria back into the
abandoned house, and committed a penetrative sex act on Victoria.
In both instances, extreme coercion enabled the sexual penetration of a
victim, two offenders were involved, and each offender needed the other to
accomplish the resulting harm.5 Because Defendant Taylor’s offense
involved multiple perpetrators, he faced up to thirty years’ imprisonment as
a rapist. In the hypothetical case, Phillip would likely face a severe penalty:
up to fifteen years’ imprisonment for aggravated battery, five years’

*J.D., 2017, Florida International University (FIU) College of Law. Thank you Professor Eric R. Carpenter

for your seminar, Sexual Violence Against Women, and your guidance in academic writing; FIU Law
Review for diligently editing this proposal; and my parents and Jheny Quispe for your constant support.
1

Taylor v. Florida, 619 So. 2d 1017, 1018 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).

FLA. STAT. § 794.023 (1991); Taylor, 619 So. 2d at 1018; see also FLA. STAT. § 775.082(3)(b),
(d) (2017).
2
3

See Taylor, 619 So. 2d at 1018.

In this proposal, “prostitute” broadly refers to any person who participates in sexual acts as part
of a financial transaction.
4

5 Phillip’s actions enabled Jones’ nonconsensual sex acts for Phillip’s financial gain, which, in
turn, relied upon Jones’ cooperation. See Concerted Action, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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imprisonment for coercing another to become a prostitute, or even stiffer
sentences under state or federal human trafficking laws.6
Significantly, Jones—who knowingly, or at least recklessly, committed
the penetrative sex act on a victim subject to extreme coercion by another—
would face less than one year’s imprisonment, if any imprisonment; pay
some fines; and participate in a rehabilitative program.7 The law views Jones
as merely a “john.”8 He cannot be charged as an accomplice to Phillip, unless
he intended to promote or facilitate Phillip’s crimes of aggravated battery,
coercing another to become a prostitute, or human trafficking.9 The facts here
do not suggest that Jones cared whether Phillip battered, coerced, or
trafficked the Victoria. However, he did know, or was at least aware of the
substantial risk, that someone had harmed Victoria to coerce her compliance
to the penetrative sex act, and that is extremely culpable behavior. This
disconnect between culpability and punishment forms the basis of this
proposal.
To capture Jones’ culpability, legislatures must criminalize
“cooperative rape.” Cooperative rape occurs where one perpetrator coerces a
victim into prostitution;10 and another perpetrator, knowing or aware of the
substantial risk that coercion was used, commits a penetrative sex act on the
victim. As applied to the hypothetical, Phillip coerced Victoria into
prostitution; and Jones, ignoring the coercion, or at least the obvious signs of
such coercion, committed a penetrative sex act on Victoria. While existing
law captures Phillip’s culpable behavior, criminalization of cooperative rape
would capture Jones’ participation in what amounts to a rape, rather than an
illicit transaction. Further, criminalization of cooperative rape would
acknowledge that Victoria survived a rape, rather than willingly participated
in prostitution.

6 See 22 U.S.C. §§ 7102, 7109 (2018); FLA. STAT. §§ 775.082(3)(d), 784.045(1)(a)(2),
787.06(3)(b), 796.04 (2018).
7 See FLA. STAT. §§ 775.082(4)(a), 775.083(1)(d), 796.07(5)(a)(1) (2018). For consistency, both
Taylor and the hypothetical were analyzed under Florida law, but this disconnect exists nationally. See,
e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-11-9 (2018); CAL. PENAL CODE § 647.1 (Deering 2018); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§
70.15(2), 80.05(2), 230.00 (Consol. 2018).
8 “John” is shorthand for one who engages a prostitute. The term “emphasizes the temporary
namelessness granted patrons in the context of prostitution . . . . [T]he anonymity of prostitution offers an
escape from accountability.” Courtney Guyton Persons, Sex in the Sunlight: The Effectiveness, Efficiency,
Constitutionality, and Advisability of Publishing Names and Pictures of Prostitutes’ Patrons, 49 VAND.
L. REV. 1525, 1529–30 (1996).
9 “By definition an accomplice must be a person who acts with the purpose of promoting or
facilitating the commission of the substantive offense for which he is charged as an accomplice.”
Accomplice, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 annot.
(AM. LAW INST. 1997)).
10 This proposal focuses on coerced prostitution, but the framework may be expanded to
encompass other situations.
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This proposal will show that the societally normalized transaction
between a prostitute and a john sometimes conceals an underlying rape, and
that this concealment allows some johns to escape punishment that matches
their culpability. The proposal offers a solution by advancing the elements of
cooperative rape. In doing so, the proposal reviews the current state of
coercion in rape law and in prostitution, the current relationship between
culpability and sentencing for perpetrators in the sex trade, and the argument
that criminalization of cooperative rape will result in better proportionality
of culpability to justice.
Most simply defined, “rape” is a penetrative act perpetrated without the
victim’s consent. “Consent” is best defined as “a person’s willingness to
engage in a specific act,” which may be inferred, established, withdrawn, or
overridden by communication, action, inaction, or behavior.11 A recent
Model Penal Code Tentative Draft provides clear examples of factors a factfinder might consider in determining consent, such as prior history between
the parties, displays of affection, intoxication, or incapacitation.12 As
Schulhofer put it: “Ordinary citizens know what it means to have permission,
express or implied, and they know that it is unacceptable to take liberties with
someone’s person or property without permission.”13 Furthermore, coercion,
just like physical force, precludes consent.14
My proposal would only criminalize knowledge, or recklessness as to
the risk, of extreme coercion: force or the threat of force. The majority of
jurisdictions already recognize coercion as a form of force, or at least as
invalidating consent.15 The most restrictive definition, which is nearly
11 MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.0(4) (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2016). An alleged
victim’s “willingness” is a factual question to be determined in the usual contextual, totality of the
circumstances fact-finding inquiry. See id.
12 MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.0(3) cmt. (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2016)
(commenting on relevant factors to a fact-finder’s inquiry into consent).
13 Stephen J. Schulhofer, Consent: What It Means and Why It’s Time to Require It, 47 U. PAC. L.
REV. 665, 681 (2016).
14 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.0(3) cmt. (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2016)
(indicating that consent must be “voluntary,” that is, “freely given” rather than a result of duress, extortion,
or some other cognizable pressure).
15 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE, §§ 213.0(3)(e), 213.1 cmt. 2 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft
No. 5, Sept. 8, 2015). However, a minority view fails to recognize coercion as force in rape cases. See
MODEL PENAL CODE, § 213.1 cmt. (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 5, Sept. 8, 2015) (listing and
contrasting state statutes). The minority view results from the historical emphasis on physical force and
the sufficiency of a victim’s resistance, rather than the victim’s consent. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
CRIMINAL LAW § 17.3(a), at 1134 (6th ed. 2017). The historical emphasis demanded scientifically
uncharacteristic behavior from victims and anticipated violent force in rapes committed by strangers,
which are the least common sort of rape. See Rebecca Campbell, Professor of Psychology, Michigan State
University, Lecture at Lewis & Clark Law School: The Neurobiology of Sexual Assault: Implications for
the Legal System’s Response to Rape Survivors (Dec. 3, 2012) (transcript available at
http://www.nij.gov/multimedia/presenter/presenter-campbell/pages/presenter-campbell-transcript.aspx);
David Lisak & Paul M. Miller, Repeat Rape and Multiple Offending Among Undetected
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universally accepted, includes express or implied threats of physical force as
coercion.16 Although traditionalists look to physical resistance and
progressives look to whether the victim’s will was overcome,17 threats of
physical force suffice as solid legal ground for this proposal. Notably,
implied threats are equally accepted grounds because force is merely a
sufficient condition for rape, not a necessary one, as evidenced by the fact
that “[n]ineteen states have eliminated a force requirement altogether.”18
Turning to the sex trade, coercion is a driving force in some forms of
prostitution. The intersection of coercion and prostitution is very clear in
some respects and hotly debated in others.19 This proposal is meant to address
perpetrators that are culpable for the most coercive forms of prostitution, but
not yet captured by current law.
Human trafficking presents the clearest examples of coercion in relation
to the sex trade.20 Congress enacted the Trafficking Victims Protection Act
(TVPA),21 and its subsequent amendments,22 to address this serious problem.
Accordingly, sentencing for offenses involving sexual abuse of trafficked
persons reflects the culpability of perpetrators by enabling imprisonment “for
any term of years or life” for a trafficker.23 However, the TVPA does not
Rapists, 17 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 73, 78 (2002), http://www.davidlisak.com/wp-content/uploads/pdf/Re
peatRapeinUndetectedRapists.pdf.
16 See MODEL PENAL CODE, §§ 213.0(3)(e); 213.1 cmt. (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 5,
Sept. 8, 2015).
17

Compare LAFAVE, supra note 15, with State v. Brooks, 317 P.3d 54, 64–65 (Kan. 2014).

18

MODEL PENAL CODE, § 213.1 cmt. (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 5, Sept. 8, 2015).

Compare Catharine A. MacKinnon, Trafficking, Prostitution, and Inequality, 46 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 271, 308 (2011) (arguing that prostitutes have not voluntarily chosen their work but are
unfortunates with “no real options in a sex-discriminatory economic setting”) and Lauren Hersh,
Prostitution Is Not Just Another Job, PROSTITUTION RES. & EDUC. (Mar. 30, 2016),
http://prostitutionresearch.com/2016/03/31/prostitution-is-not-just-another-job/
(“Prostitution
is
inevitable. Prostitution is about choice. Prostitution is empowering. These are the myths that those with
a vested interest in the sex trade want you to believe.”), with Holly B. Fechner, Three Stories of
Prostitution in the West: Prostitutes’ Groups, Law and Feminist “Truth”, 4 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 26,
38 (1994) (discussing “prostitution as work,” which prefers a laissez-faire perspective of freedom to
prostitute).
19

20 See, e.g., United States v. Cortes-Meza, 411 F. App’x 284, 286 (11th Cir. 2011) (describing
allegations of a conspiracy that began with promises of legitimate immigration and job opportunities, and
ended with coercion into prostitution through violence, assertion of debts, and other pressures).
21

Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat.

1464.
22 Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-193, 117 Stat.
2875; Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-164, 119 Stat. 3558;
William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub L. No. 110-457,
122 Stat. 5044. See Lindsay Strauss, Adult Domestic Trafficking and the William Wilberforce Trafficking
Victims Protection Reauthorization Act, 19 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 495, 500–04 (2010) (discussing
how each amending act built upon the law to progress toward addressing domestic trafficking of all people
for forced labor in addition to the forced prostitution of women and children).
23

18 U.S.C. § 1590(a) (2018).
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label the trafficker a rape facilitator, nor does it encompass the john’s
culpable behavior.24 State human trafficking laws similarly focus on the
perpetrator of the “force, fraud, or coercion.”25
Other forms of prostitution may involve lesser forms of coercion, but,
provided that the coercion involved violence or the threat of violence,
cooperative rape would encompass them. “American culture generally
portrays actual prostitution as an illegal institution practiced largely by
desperate, young, drug-addicted female streetwalkers controlled by abusive
pimps.”26 While this oversimplification does not capture all iterations of
prostitution, “streetwalkers,” meaning “prostitutes [who] solicit customers
outdoors,”27 often are the victims of serious coercion. Although human
traffickers and pimps are legally distinguishable,28 Elrod points out that
“prostitution and sex trafficking are inherently linked.”29 This is the result of
human traffickers and coercive pimps taking advantage of the difficulty in
distinguishing, at a distance, autonomous prostitutes from coerced victims.30
“Street prostitution is considered the lowest level of prostitution,” and
nearly 60% of streetwalkers worked for a pimp.31 Streetwalkers are often
“kept subservient by pimps” and face great risk of continuing victimization.32
Significantly, “[80%] of street-based prostitutes interviewed had experienced
or been threatened with violence while working[,] police did not take their
complaints seriously and . . . 27% actually experienced violence at the hands

24 But see Andrew Hall, The Uniform Act on Prevention of and Remedies for Human Trafficking,
56 ARIZ. L. REV. 853, 882 n.210 (2014) (indicating that some advocates have argued that in some instances
a john may be prosecuted as a trafficker).
25

See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 787.06 (2016).

ANISE K. STRONG, PROSTITUTES AND MATRONS IN THE ROMAN WORLD 201 (Cambridge Univ.
Press 2016).
26

27 Daria Snadowsky, The Best Little Whorehouse Is Not in Texas: How Nevada’s Prostitution
Laws Serve Public Policy, and How Those Laws May Be Improved, 6 NEV. L.J. 217, 232–33 (2005).
28 See generally John Elrod, Filling the Gap: Refining Sex Trafficking Legislation to Address the
Problem of Pimping, 68 VAND. L. REV. 961 (2015). Elrod’s article mainly focuses on the similarities of
traffickers and pimps, thus, recognizing them as two distinct groups, and arguing for a more liberal
construction of coercion regarding both crimes. Id. Elrod noted, “most johns seeking sex are willing to
overlook any possibility of coercion in exchange for a lower price,” but did not directly address the
problem of johns committing sex acts on such coerced victims. Id. at n.95 (citing GARY A. HAUGEN &
VICTOR BOUTROS, THE LOCUST EFFECT: WHY THE END OF POVERTY REQUIRES THE END OF VIOLENCE
58 (2014)).
29 Id. at 974–76. “[A] pimp functions as far more than just an agent for a prostitute––frequently, a
pimp will also establish relationships with vulnerable individuals and work to recruit them into
prostitution.” Id. at 978 (citing Stephen C. Parker & Jonathan T. Skrmetti, Pimps Down: A Prosecutorial
Perspective on Domestic Sex Trafficking, 43 U. MEM. L. REV. 1013, 1023–29 (2013)).
30

See Elrod, supra note 28, at 976–77.

31

Susan E. Thompson, Prostitution: A Choice Ignored, 21 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 217, 225–26

(2000).
32

Snadowsky, supra note 27, at 233 (citing Dinitz v. Christensen, 577 P.2d 873, 875 (Nev. 1978)).
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of police.”33 The vast majority of streetwalkers face violence, or at least
threats of violence,34 and were threatened with a weapon, battered, and raped
while prostituting.35
Some prostitutes operate freely, or at least absent the sorts of extreme
coercion discussed supra, and would not be encompassed by this proposal.
Such prostitutes may exercise the right to choose or reject clients or
participate in a regulated industry, and earn an annual salary rivalling middleclass forms of employment.36 Some of these prostitutes work without a pimp
and consider themselves more respectable than streetwalkers.37 Furthermore,
some feminists argue “prostitution can be a tool of empowerment” that
enables economic freedom and sexual autonomy.38 This proposal would not
reach that class of prostitution.
Current law treats some rape-survivors as prostitutes, rape-facilitators
as pimps, and cooperative-rapists as johns. Laws that address pimping tend
to be proportional to culpability, but laws prosecuting johns do not.
Generally, a human trafficker faces much more severe consequences than a
streetwalker’s pimp, but johns face only misdemeanors.39 The following table
summarizes a representative, present punishment scheme:40
Circumstance
First Offense
Second Offense or
Aggravating Factor
Subsequent Offense or
Aggravating Factor

Human Trafficker

Pimp

John

20 years in prison

15 years in prison

1 year

Life in prison

30 years in prison

5 years

Life in prison

30 years in prison, 10-year
minimum

15 years

33 Revolving Door: An Analysis of Street-Based Prostitution in New York City, SEX WORKERS
PROJECT URB. JUST. CTR., http://sexworkersproject.org/downloads/RevolvingDoorFS.html (last visited
Jan. 20, 2019).
34

Id.

Melissa Farley et al., Prostitution and Trafficking in Nine Countries: An Update on Violence
and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, in PROSTITUTION, TRAFFICKING, AND TRAUMATIC STRESS 33, 43
(Melissa Farley ed., 2003).
35

36 Coyote Publ’g, Inc. v. Miller, 598 F.3d 592, 595–96 (9th Cir. 2010) (providing an overview of
Nevada’s legal prostitution framework). Nevada’s regulation of prostitution is comparable to the ancient
Roman system, in which the government taxed and protected prostitutes. STRONG, supra note 26, at 202;
see Thompson, supra note 31, at 220.
37

See Thompson, supra note 31, at 219.

38

Id. at 217–18.

See Heather C. Gregorio, Note, More Than “Johns,” Less Than Traffickers: In Search of Just
and Proportional Sanctions for Buyers of Sex with Trafficking Victims, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 626, 637–39
(2015) (noting that some johns of trafficking victims have been prosecuted as traffickers, although most
trafficking law is directed toward “pimps”).
39

40

See 18 U.S.C. § 1590(a) (2018); FLA. STAT. §§ 775.082(3)(b), 796.05; (d); 796.07(5)(a) (2018).
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Clearly, human traffickers and pimps face stern punishment; however,
they escape the rape-facilitator label. Notably, pimps could be charged as
principals under innocent-instrumentality accomplice liability, but johns
would continue to evade appropriate punishment.41 The johns that this
proposal targets would escape criminal liability under the innocentinstrumentality doctrine because they do not necessarily intend to commit
nonconsensual sex acts, but rather intend to commit sex acts without regard
to consent.42
Johns must be prosecuted for cooperative rape when they commit
penetrative sex acts knowing that the victim has been coerced into
compliance or when they recklessly disregard indications of that fact. It has
already been argued that “johns of trafficking victims [should be prosecuted]
under legislation explicitly addressing this group,” and that “targeted
legislation [should use] tailored mens rea standards and flexible penalties
correlated to culpability.”43 In terms of prostitution, although the line
between coercive and voluntary prostitution may sometimes be blurred, in
some scenarios signs of coercion will be so blatant that a john should be held
accountable for ignoring them. This proposal only reaches such johns that act
with a culpable mens rea. Specifically, cooperative rape captures johns that
either knew their victim was subject to coercion or were reckless as to
contextually obvious indications of coercion. Referring to the hypothetical,
Jones committed penetrative sex acts on Victoria notwithstanding her tears,
bruises, and blood, which clearly amounted to culpable and deviant conduct.
Accordingly, cooperative rape occurs when (1) a victim, such as
Victoria, is coerced into prostitution by a pimp, such as Phillip; and (2) a
john, such as Jones, knowingly or recklessly ignores the risk of such coercion
preventing consent; (3) and commits a penetrative sex act on the victim.
Significantly, where coercion is legally equivalent to physical force, such
cooperative rape scenarios are more comparable to sexual battery by multiple
perpetrators than an illicit transaction.44

41 The innocent-instrumentality doctrine applies when the “person committing the physical acts
that constitute the crime is (as the doctrine suggests) a tool of the coercive/manipulative party.” Joshua
Dressler, Reforming Complicity Law: Trivial Assistance as a Lesser Offense?, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 427,
431 n.21 (2008). For example, if a pimp coerced a victim into prostitution, and a john subsequently
committed penetrative sex acts on that victim—without any indication that the victim was coerced and
precluded from consent—the pimp would have caused a sexual assault. Specifically, the pimp caused a
victim to be susceptible to nonconsensual sex acts, which he intended to occur by another person, who
may lack the intent to commit a sexual assault. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW
§ 30.03(A)(2)(b) (7th ed. 2015).
42

See DRESSLER, supra note 41, at § 30.03(A)(3).

43

Gregorio, supra note 39, at 626.

44

Cf. FLA. STAT. § 794.023 (2018).
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Application of cooperative rape requires only three steps: identifying the
coercion; proving the perpetrator committed a sex act on the victim; and, the
key to this proposal, identifying indicators that prove the john at least
recklessly disregarded the consent-barring coercion while committing the sex
act on the victim.45 That is, the john “consciously disregard[ed] a substantial
and unjustifiable risk,” which “involve[d] a gross deviation from [reasonable]
conduct.”46 Practically, this looks like Jones ignoring Victoria’s cuts, bruises,
and tears. In such a scenario, the john and the pimp cooperated to accomplish
a rape in that the john committed the penetrative sex act and the pimp
restrained the victim via coercion.47
This proposal will not subject “normal” men to criminal prosecution,
but rather targets exceptional deviants.48 A john without the requisite mental
state for cooperative rape can simply demand that the prosecution prove the
elements and argue that sufficient indicators of coercion were not present.
The johns that would be successfully prosecuted under this proposal have at
least recklessly disregarded the likelihood that a victim was subject to a sex
act because of extreme coercion. Thus, the prosecution would have to prove
to the fact-finder that the john noticed the victim’s pleas for help, bloody
nose, bruised body, tears, or other indicators prior to the penetrative sex act.
Johns that disregard such indicators grossly deviate from reasonable
conduct.49
Cooperative rapists are not widespread. In fact, Jones from the
hypothetical displayed a rare sexual deviancy. In the United States, between
15% and 20% of men have paid “for sex at least once in their lifetimes.”50
Although a 20% lifetime frequency may sound somewhat common, “only
about 1%” of American men surveyed reported having paid for sex in the
45 The last step presumes the victim was coerced; however, the element should not require that
such coercion actually occurred because the emphasis is instead on the john’s mens rea.
46

MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (AM. LAW INST. 2015).

Neither actor need act with specific intent, in that neither the pimp nor the john must intend for
a nonconsensual sexual act to occur, see id. at § 2.02(2)(a); however, the pimp must be aware that the
coercion was “practically certain” to cause rape, see id. at § 2.02(2)(b).
47

Johns are often notably apathetic toward prostitutes suffering coercion. MELISSA FARLEY ET
MEN WHO BUY SEX: WHO THEY BUY AND WHAT THEY KNOW 16 (2009),
https://i1.cmsfiles.com/eaves/2012/04/MenWhoBuySex-89396b.pdf (quoting a john as stating, “‘Some
[prostitutes] are really made to or forced—like raped—and they find there is no other hope for them . . . .
I felt a little bit guilty when I was in saunas and massage parlours’”).
48

AL.,

49

See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (AM. LAW INST. 2015).

Percentage of Men (by Country) Who Paid for Sex at Least Once: The Johns Chart,
PROCON.ORG
(Jan.
6,
2011,
3:00
PM),
http://prostitution.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=004119. Earlier studies had found up to
80% of American men have paid for sex, but those studies suffered from unrepresentative samples. See
Martin A. Monto & Christine Milrod, Ordinary or Peculiar Men? Comparing the Customers of Prostitutes
with a Nationally Representative Sample of Men, 58 INT’L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY
802, 803 (2014).
50
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previous year.51 Of that 1%, presumably at least some will have engaged in
prostitution absent any indication that the victim was coerced. Thus, it is
likely that cooperative rapists are an even smaller subset of that 1%.
Cooperative rapists are not the “average American Joe.” According to
Monto and Milrod’s study, the average American john is white; between
forty and fifty-nine years old; low income, yet working full-time; married;
and, curiously, finds extramarital sex to be “always wrong.”52 The data
available, according to Monto and Milrod, “do not support the idea that
customers are peculiar men,” rather than merely a smaller percentage of the
population than is commonly assumed.53 However, nearly half of johns
surveyed believed that prostitutes were generally victims of coercion.54 To
rephrase, or perhaps interpret, this data: johns makeup a small percentage of
the population, and many of them readily admit that they have paid to commit
sex acts on victims they believed were coerced into compliance.
These johns form a small percentage of the population and, importantly,
draw enjoyment from committing sex acts on a victim that is an apparent
victim of coercion. That is abnormal and dangerous. Such johns are culpable
for more than a misdemeanor.55 The current structure fails to match justice to
the level of culpability in cooperative rape. The current punishment scheme
seems to be based more on traditional patriarchal perspective and the
mistaken belief that johns are our friends and neighbors, who are not causing
any real harm.
Criminalization of cooperative rape will ensure that cooperative rapists
are distinguished from johns. Referring back to the hypothetical,
criminalization of cooperative rape enacts punishment for Jones proportional
to committing a penetrative sex act on a nonconsenting victim, instead of
participation in an arguably malum prohibitum illicit transaction with a
prostitute. Criminalization of cooperative rape further denies Phillip the
opportunity to present his crime as merely facilitating such an illicit
transaction, rather than cooperating in a rape.
The problem described was not immediately obvious because American
society is quick to blame prostitutes. For example, brilliant legal sources have

51

Monto & Milrod, supra note 50, at 807, 815.

52

Id. at 810–11 (Table 2).

53

See id. at 816.

54

Gregorio, supra note 39, at 637 n.43 (citing FARLEY ET AL., supra note 48, at 14, 16).

For a first offense, such johns generally face community service, rehabilitative programs, and a
maximum of one-year imprisonment. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 775.082(4)(a), 775.082(9)(a)(3)(d),
796.07(2)(f), 796.07(5) (2018). This is comparable to most states, which tend to classify solicitation for
prostitution as a second-degree misdemeanor or similar low-level violation or offense. See Richard A.
Leiter & William S. Hein & Co., 50 State Statutory Surveys: Prohibited Consensual Sexual Activity, 0030
SURVS.14 (2007).
55

550

FIU Law Review

[Vol. 13:541

described prostitution as a “victimless crime,”56 organized prostitution and
pimping statutes under “Offenses against Public Order and Decency,”57
regarded pimps as much less culpable than human traffickers,58 allowed johns
to all but escape criminal liability,59 and disguised victims as prostitutes, and
treated them like criminals. However, as sexual assault law continues to
evolve, criminalization of cooperative rape will legitimize victims’
understanding of their victimization and provide just consequences to
perpetrators. Once this has occurred, and normalized in society, the coercion
standard in cooperative rape may continue to track the progressive, more
expansive definitions of coercion. Ideally, the final iteration of cooperative
rape will protect any victim kept subservient by any threats that overcame
that victim’s will.

56

Alexander v. DeAngelo, 329 F.3d 912, 915 (7th Cir. 2003) (deciding a civil rights claim).

57

MODEL PENAL CODE § 251.2 (AM. LAW INST. 2015).

58

Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1590(a) (2018), with FLA. STAT. §§ 775.082(3)(b), 775.082(3)(d), 796.05

(2018).
59 Compare FLA. STAT. §§ 775.082(3)(b), 775.082(3)(d) (2018), and FLA. STAT. § 796.05 (2018),
with FLA. STAT. §§ 775.082(4)(a), 775.082(9)(a)(3)(d), 796.07(2)(f), 796.07(5) (2018), and FLA. STAT. §
775.082(3)(d) (2018).

